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Supplemental Jurisdiction over
Permissive Counterclaims and Set
Offs: A Misconception
by Douglas D. McFarland*
I.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

In the years prior to 1990, courts extended federal jurisdiction over
joined claims and parties in an orderly system. Pendent jurisdiction
allowed a plaintiff to join a state law theory of recovery to a federal
question theory in the complaint when both arose from a "common
nucleus of operative fact."' Ancillary jurisdiction allowed a defendant
to join a state law claim to a federal claim in a civil action when both
arose from the same "transaction or occurrence."2 Since a compulsory
counterclaim arose from the same "transaction or occurrence" and a
permissive counterclaim did not,' courts had no difficulty in holding

* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. Macalester College (B.A., 1968);
New York University School of Law (J.D., 1971); University of Minnesota (Ph.D., 1983).
The Author wishes to thank Nicholas Zinos, Hamline University School of Law, Class of
2012, for his research assistance on this Article.
1. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
2.

See, e.g., 16 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 106.04

(3d ed. 2012) (describing the history and development of both pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION & RELATED MATTERS § 3523 (3d ed. 2008) (same).

When defendant attempted to join a claim that did not arise from the same transaction
or occurrence, ancillary jurisdiction did not apply and that claim was not heard in federal
court unless it had its own federal jurisdictional basis. WRIGHT ET AL., supra § 3523.
3. A compulsory counterclaim was defined in 1990 as "any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." JAMS
W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE R. 13, at 143 (1990). A permissive counterclaim

was defined in 1990 as "any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." Id.
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that compulsory counterclaims always qualified and permissive
counterclaims never qualified for ancillary jurisdiction.4 The law was
consistent, parallel, and nearly universally accepted.5

The rule today has been changed only in plain language editing. A compulsory
counterclaim "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A). A permissive counterclaim is any
claim "against an opposing party... that is not compulsory." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
4. This result followed inevitably from the use of the same transaction or occurrence
test for both counterclaims and ancillary jurisdiction. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 3523, at 186-88 ("Courts universally exercised supplemental jurisdiction (usually called
ancillary jurisdiction) over defendant's compulsory counterclaims under Civil Rule 13(a)
....
On the other hand, permissive counterclaims, under Civil Rule 13(b) generally did
not invoke supplemental jurisdiction. By definition, these claims do not arise from the
same transaction or occurrence as the jurisdiction-invoking claim. . . ."); Richard D. Freer,
CompoundingConfusion andHamperingDiversity:Life After Finley and the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 451 (1991) ("[LMower courts had come to equate
the transactional test for joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the
constitutional test for exercising power over claims lacking an independent basis of federal
jurisdiction."); Arthur R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,26 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 6
(1985); Michelle S. Simon, Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367: A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims,9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv.
295, 301-04 (2005); Neel K. Chopra, Note, Valuing the Federal Right: Reevaluating the
Outer Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction,83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1915, 1916 (2008).
The doctrine may trace back to Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. National Electric
Signaling Co., 206 F. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1913), a case that preceded the federal rules.
5. A lone commentator argued in 1953 that federal courts should have ancillary
jurisdiction over all counterclaims, both compulsory and permissive, since both claim and
counterclaim were "parts of a single action," and thus part of the same constitutional case
or controversy. Thomas F. Green, Jr., FederalJurisdictionOver Counterclaims,48 Nw. U.
L. REV. 271, 273 (1953). Professor Green thought the framers of the Constitution used
"case" to refer to "the unit of litigation which the law of procedure, in the normal course
of events, allows to be disposed of at one trial." Id. at 293.
Several problems marred this argument. First, the argument tied the scope of a case or
controversy to the scope of the action allowed by rules of procedure. Surely a constitutional
definition cannot be as changeable as rules of procedure. Second, the argument relied on
several old cases, all long-preceding the promulgation of the federal rules, for the
proposition that "[a] counterclaim or set-off is not a separate action," and then equated a
"civil action" under the federal rules to a constitutional case. Id. at 273 n.13, 293-94. Yet
allowance of joinder under the federal rules has never provided authority for the joined
claim to be part of the same constitutional case. Even the author himself later rejected the
guidance of "the English courts of equity for the measure of federal jurisdiction." Id. at
288. Third, the argument looked to a "litigation unit" and stated "[a] counterclaim when
used to defeat the plaintiffs claim has practically the same purpose and effect as a
defense." Id. at 277-78. Well, no. A successful counterclaim may have the same practical
effect as a defense in the sense it reduces the plaintiffs award, but neither does that make
a factually unrelated counterclaim part of the same litigation unit, nor does it make a
factually unrelated counterclaim part of the same constitutional case. Finally, the
argument rested on the convenience, efficiency, and slight burden of trying the additional
facts of the counterclaim. Id. at 279. But that argument applies only when the facts
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CONGRESS CREATES SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Congress entered this area of the law in 1990.6 It melded both
pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction into supplemental
jurisdiction:
[Iun any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties.'

The codification in section 1367(a) used neither the common nucleus of
operative fact test from pendent jurisdiction nor the transaction or
occurrence test from ancillary jurisdiction as the test for the reach of
supplemental jurisdiction; instead, it used the new phrase "same case or
controversy under Article III."'
In swapping phrases, did Congress in 1990 change the law governing
supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims? While little doubt exists
that "case or controversy under Article III" encompasses both "common

overlap, which almost certainly means the counterclaim is compulsory; further, these
considerations cannot be the measure of federal jurisdiction.
Even with these flaws, Professor Green's argument received support from a famous
judge. When the majority of the panel perhaps reached too far in its conclusion that a
counterclaim was compulsory, Judge Henry Friendly disagreed that the counterclaim was
compulsory but added:
I would now reject the conventional learning... that the permissive counterclaim
I"] needs independent jurisdictional grounds to support it, with one exception, ["I
to wit, set-off, 3 Moore, Federal Practice P13.19 at 53-54 (2d ed. 1968) ....
Professor Moore's sound recognition-perhaps more accurately creation-of the
exception that set-off requires no independent jurisdictional basis ... carries the
seeds of destruction of the supposed general rule.
United States ex rel. DAgostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077,
1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring). This could have signaled a broader attack
on the permissive counterclaim/no ancillary jurisdiction pairing, but no court or judge
followed Judge Friendly's suggestion.
A few courts and commentators eventually recognized set off as the lone exception to the
rule, but even this single exception was illusory. See infra Part V.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
7. Id. The statute has four additional subsections, which limit this grant of federal
jurisdiction in certain diversity cases, permit the court discretion to refuse the jurisdiction,
provide for tolling the state statute of limitations, and define state to include territories.
Id. § 1367(b)-(e). These additional provisions are not relevant here.
8. Id. § 1367(a).
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nucleus of operative fact"9 and "same transaction or occurrence," 10 the
real question is whether "case or controversy under Article III" has
expanded the reach of supplemental jurisdiction because it is broader
than these constituent parts." The legislative history shows Congress
had no such broadening intent. 12 The intent was merely to codify the
existing law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and to add pendent
party jurisdiction. 3 Many federal courts since 1990 have decided that

9. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3523, at 172 nn.42-43; § 3567.1, at 337 n-9
(collecting cases).
10. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3567.1, at 343 n.23.
11. Sometimes the position that "case or controversy under Article MI"of § 1367(a) is
broader than"common nucleus of operative fact" or"transaction or occurrence" is expressed
in the proposition that supplemental jurisdiction requires only a "loose factual connection"
between claims:
As noted, no one disputes that the Gibbs standard, and therefore § 1367(a),
embraces claims that arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the
underlying dispute. But it is error to equate the two. The Gibbs "common
nucleus" test is broader than the "transaction or occurrence" test used in the Civil
Rules. In practice, § 1367(a) requires only that the jurisdiction-invoking claim and
the supplemental claim have some loose factual connection.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3567.1, at 349 (collecting cases). This statement is
supportable as to the broad reach of "same case or controversy" but errs when it attributes
a narrow reach to "same transaction or occurrence." See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
12. Pursuant to the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988), Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed the Federal
Courts Study Committee. Id. at 4644. The Committee made many recommendations to
Congress, including that federal courts should be able to hear any claims arising out of the
same "transaction or occurrence." See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 171-

86 (Apr. 2, 1990). Early drafts of § 1367(a) used transaction or occurrence. C. Douglas
Floyd, Three Facesof Supplemental JurisdictionAfter the Demise of United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 60 FLA. L. REV. 277, 301 n. 125 (2008). During the legislative process, a group of
academicians proposed the case or controversy language instead. See Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 5381 and
3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., at 722 (1990). Nothing in committee
reports or floor debate suggests why the case or controversy phrase was substituted. See
MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 106.20. The origin of the term "supplemental jurisdiction"
is similarly unclear, although the study committee report did refer to pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction as "supplemental forms of jurisdiction." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM., supra, at 47.

13. Floor debate included the statement that the statute was intended "to implement
the non-controversial recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee," see 136
Cong. Rec. H13313 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990), and Congress referred to the statute as
implementing noncontroversial reforms. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation
Act of 1990, H.R. REP. 101-734 (1990). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3567, at
321; Floyd, supra note 12, at 278, 299-301.
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the statute made no change in the law: compulsory counterclaims still
automatically qualify for 14supplemental jurisdiction, and permissive
counterclaims still do not.
TWO CASES MISINTERPRET TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE
CREATING A MISCONCEPTION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS

III.

The first challenge to this settled law was raised in 1996 in Channell
v. CiticorpNational Services, Inc."5 The lessee of a car had an accident
that wrecked the leased car. The lease finance company demanded the
deficiency balance due on the lease. The lessee took the offensive by
6
commencing a class action for violations of the Consumer Leasing Act.'
The defendant17 lease finance company counterclaimed for the balance due
on the lease.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit opinion
first concluded the counterclaim was permissive and not compulsory"5
In doing so, the court relied on poor authority and made no attempt at
its own reasoned analysis.' 9 Next, the opinion concluded that only "a

Scholars accept that the primary impetus for the statute was a desire to overrule the
Supreme Court's refusal in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), to recognize
pendent party jurisdiction. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3567, at 321-22; Denis
F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and
Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 885-89 (1992).
14. Only a year after the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Seventh Circuit relied solely
on pre-1990 cases and authorities when it announced in dictum "[a] federal court has
supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims .... Permissive counterclaims,
however, require their own jurisdictional basis." Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Manuel, 930 F.2d
573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991). Seven years later, the First Circuit also cited only pre-1990 cases
when it wrote, "Only compulsory counterclaims can rely upon supplemental jurisdiction;
permissive counterclaims require their own jurisdictional basis." Iglesias v. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. of N.Y., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1998). Even with this dated analytical underpinning, other courts agreed. See, e.g., Plymouth Yongle Tape (Shanghai) Co. v. Plymouth
Rubber Co., 683 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D. Mass. 2009); Kellogg USA, Inc. v. B. Fernandez
Hermanos, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.P.R. 2007); Mathias v. Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d
606, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 952 F.
Supp. 1399, 1405 (D. Nebr. 1997). The First Circuit may have more recently altered its
position. See infra Part IV.C.
15. 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996).
16. Id. at 381; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (Supp. 2010).
17. Channell, 89 F.3d at 381.
18. Id. at 384-85.
19. See id. The opinion cited only Valencia v. Anderson Brothers Ford,617 F.2d 1278,
1289-90 (7th Cir. 1980), reu'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981) (concluding a
counterclaim to collect the balance of a loan was permissive in a suit under the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA)). The Channell opinion made no effort to explain why this reversed
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loose factual connection" was required for supplemental jurisdiction since
§ 1367(a) extended jurisdiction to the limits of Article III.2" The court
then found this loose factual connection because both the plaintiff's
Consumer Leasing Act claim and the defendant's debt counterclaim
arose from the same lease:
Each class member's claim against Citicorp depends on the lease, and
indeed on the same clause of the lease that creates Citicorp's claim for
a termination charge. The acts creating the claims differ-the claims
against Citicorp stem from the signing of the lease, while the claims
against the class stem from the early termination of the lease. But the
parties, the lease, the clause, and even the terminations are constants
.... Signing and termination alike therefore were integral to this
case[,] ...and these events are.., a single case or controversy.2'
The court put its two conclusions together to assert, for the first time,
the proposition that supplemental jurisdiction reached a permissive
counterclaim.22
In other words, the court concluded side-by-side that claims arising
from the same lease did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence, yet claims arising from the same lease were part of the same case
or controversyY. This could not be. The two conclusions were plainly
inconsistent.'
The court's belief that the two conclusions could stand
together was based on a grudging misinterpretation of "transaction or
25
occurrence."

decision interpreting a different statute was persuasive and made no attempt at any other
analysis why the counterclaim was only permissive. See Channell, 89 F.3d at 384-85.
Valencia was itself flawed in its conclusion the counterclaim under the TILA was
permissive. See Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or Occurrence:
Counterclaims,40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 723-28 (2007).
20. Channell, 89 F.3d at 385. The court relied on two of its own precedents,
Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating only a "loose factual
connection" necessary), and Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1298-1301
(7th Cir. 1995) (concluding § 1367(a) extended supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of
Article III).
21. Channell, 89 F.3d at 385-86.
22. Id. at 386.
23. Id. at 385-86.
24. One commentator dryly noted the court "did not elaborate on why it believed that
a 'loose factual connection' that was not sufficient to satisfy the 'same transaction or
occurrence' standard of the compulsory-counterclaim rule nonetheless satisfied Article III's
same 'case or controversy' requirement." Floyd, supra note 12, at 293-94.
25. "Grudging" is borrowed from the Supreme Court's criticism in UnitedMine Workers
v.Gibbs, of the attitude of many lower courts toward pendent jurisdiction. 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966).
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"Transaction or occurrence" demands a broad, flexible, and generous
interpretation. 26 It is entirely fact-based and fact-defined: legal

26. The "transaction or occurrence" is the core of the counterclaim rule, see supra note
3, as well as several other pleading and joinder rules. As I have written at length in
previous articles, see Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The
Transactionor Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 247 (2011); McFarland, supra note 19, at 701-08, these rules follow the procedural
philosophy of the reporter for the advisory drafting committee, Charles E. Clark. Clark
was the architect of the rules in general and the joinder rules in particular. E.g., Robert
G. Bone, Mappingthe Boundariesof a Dispute:Conceptionsof Ideal Lawsuit Structurefrom
the Field Code to the FederalRules, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 80-81 (1989); Michael E. Smith,
Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915
(1976).
Clark's philosophy of procedure can be summarized in two concepts. First, procedure
should serve substance, namely, procedural rules should not impede decision of a case on
its merits. "One theme pervades [Clark's writings]: procedural technicality stands in the
way of reaching the merits, and of applying substantive law." Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 962 (1987). Second, all aspects of dispute between
parties should, whenever possible, be decided in a single litigation with the result of
efficiency and convenience to all concerned. "The purpose, as has been indicated, is to
make 'one lawsuit grow where two grew before.'" Charles A. Wright, Joinder of Claims
and Parties UnderModern PleadingRules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 580, 580 (1952).
The vehicle Clark chose to carry this philosophy into the rules was the "transaction or
occurrence." The phrase was intended-and therefore should be interpreted-as a term of
"great flexibility" to include "all those facts which a layman would naturally associate with,
or consider as being a part of, the affair, altercation, or course of dealings between the
parties." CHARLEs E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 102, at 655 (2d

ed. 1947). Clark was a severe critic of earlier code decisions that interpreted "transaction"
narrowly: "Any attempt at such classifications gives rise to ... technical demarcations
which.

. .

tend to obscure the true function of the counterclaim ...

settle in one suit as many controversies as feasible." Id. at 657.

to enable litigants to
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theories are irrelevant,2 7 and policy considerations are irrelevant," to
its scope. It is a broad phrase of inclusion.29
Because a transaction or occurrence is a fact-based, broad phrase of
inclusion, the Seventh Circuit should easily have recognized both claim
and counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence. One
lease gave rise to one set of facts. Competing claims concerning the
same clause of the same lease doubtless were part of the same "affair,
altercation, or course of dealings between the parties."30 Channell
unremarkably asserted supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory
counterclaim, not a permissive counterclaim. 31 This decision remained
largely isolated for a decade.

27. Soon after promulgation of the federal rules in 1938, Clark wrote from his new
vantage point as a federal judge: "[T]he new rules make it clear that it is not differing legal
theories, but differing occurrences or transactions, which form the basis of separate units
ofjudicial action." Atwater v. N. Am. Coal Corp., 111 F.2d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 1940) (Clark,
J., concurring). The Supreme Court agreed shortly thereafter. Reeves v. Beardall, 316
U.S. 283, 285 (1942). This search for fact boundaries, not legal theories, is consistent
throughout Clark's procedural philosophy and writings. For example, on the new concept
of a claim for relief, he wrote, "These rules make the extent of the claim involved depend
not upon legal rights, but upon the facts, that is, upon a lay view of the past events which
have given rise to the litigation." CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
659 (2d ed. 1940). He then proceeded to tie this lay view of claim to a lay view of
transaction or occurrence. Id. One commentator summed this up as follows: "Clark
described the 'unit of judicial action' in terms that assumed an empirical, real-world,
factual unity to disputes." Bone, supra note 26, at 103 n.349.
28. Other considerations, such as possible jury confusion or possible frustration of
federal substantive policy, are irrelevant and improper. The response to all of these red
herrings is the same:
All such decisions as these add to the confusion of the lawyer in understanding an
essentially simple rule. And they would not be necessary if the courts would
remember that the counterclaim rule affects only the pleadings; whatever
advantages there may be in independent actions can be retained through the
power of the courts to order separate trials, and, if need be, to enter a final
judgment on the plaintiffs claim before proceeding to consider the counterclaim.
Charles A. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern
Pleading,39 IOwA L. REv. 255, 276-77 (1954).
29. Bringing all claims and parties related by the facts of the dispute into one case
promotes convenience and efficiency to the court and the parties. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 2, § 1652, at 395; Bone, supra note 26, at 80 ("trial convenience, not in terms of
right"); Smith, supra note 26, at 916 ("economy of time and resources"). The Supreme
Court has roundly endorsed this philosophy: "Under the Rules, the impulse is toward
entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties;
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
30. See CLARK, supra note 26, § 102, at 654-55.
31. See Channell, 89 F.3d at 384-86.
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Then, in 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co.32 Plaintiff borrowers,
on behalf of a class, claimed the defendant credit company violated the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 3 when it allowed retail auto dealers to
set the interest rate on auto loans in a racially discriminatory manner.34 The defendant counterclaimed for the debts owed on the same
loans.3 5
The Second Circuit first decided in dictum that the counterclaims were
permissive and not compulsory because they did not arise from the same
transaction or occurrence.3 6 The court, relying heavily on Channell,
then nevertheless decided "[tihe counterclaims and the underlying claim
bear a sufficient factual relationship (if one is necessary) to constitute
the same 'case' within the meaning of Article III and hence of section
1367."'7 That was so because "[bloth the ECOA claim and the debt
collection claims originate from the Plaintiffs' decisions to purchase Ford
cars."38 The court, therefore, said the Second Circuit, had supplemental
jurisdiction over the permissive counterclaims. 9
The Second Circuit in Jones labored under the same misconception as
the Seventh Circuit in Channell. Not only did both claim and counterclaims have a loose factual connection of "the Plaintiffs' decisions to buy
Ford cars," but also a tight factual connection arising from the identical
loan documents. 40 Both sides of the case arose from the same transac-

32.
33.

358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2006 & Supp. 2010).

34. Jones, 358 F.3d at 207.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 209-10. The trial court concluded the counterclaims were permissive, and
defendant did not challenge the classification on appeal. Id. at 210. The Second Circuit
agreed in dictum and may well not have carefully considered the result. Id.
37. Id. at 213-14.
38. Id. at 214.
39. Id. One commentator concluded the following:
[I]n the Ford Motor lexicon, three distinct types of relationships among claims
exist for the purpose of resolving issues of joinder and supplemental jurisdiction:
(1) claims that arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence" because they have
a "logical relationship," (2) claims that fail to satisfy that standard but nonetheless
have a "loose factual connection," and (3) claims that have no factual relationship
at all. According to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the scope of the Article 1II
case extends to the second category. According to the Second Circuit, it may
extend to the third.
Floyd, supra note 12, at 296. Clearly the two courts would extend jurisdiction to the first
two categories. The commentator probably goes too far to suggest the Second Circuit may
extend jurisdiction to the third category.
40. Jones, 358 F.3d at 207-08, 213-14.
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tion or occurrence. 4
The Jones opinion perhaps recognized this
difficulty and attempted to reason around the identical factual origin of
both claim and counterclaims as follows:
Ford Credit's debt collection counterclaims are related to those
purchase contracts, but not to any particular clause or rate. Rather,
the debt collection counterclaims concern the individual Plaintiffs' nonpayment after the contract price was set. Thus, the relationship
between the counterclaims and the ECOA claim is "logical" only in the
sense that the sale, allegedly on discriminatory credit terms, was the
"but for" cause of the non-payment .... The essential facts for proving
the counterclaims and the ECOA claim are not so closely related that
resolving 42both sets of issues in one lawsuit would yield judicial
efficiency.
The court seems to suggest that the facts of non-payment of a loan are
not sufficiently related to the facts of creation of the loan.43 Did the
court think this distinction made any sense? The claim and counterclaim arose from the same loan document." Certainly evidence of the
terms of the underlying loan would be at the core of a collection claim
on the very same loan. One contract gave rise to one transaction or
occurrence.45 As with Channell, Jones was unremarkably asserting
supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim.
Why Jones pushed so hard to find the counterclaim was only
permissive is even more puzzling since the result was bootless. The
answer almost certainly lies in the court's mention that allowing such
counterclaims into federal court "might undermine the ECOA enforcement scheme." ' In other words, allowing a compulsory counterclaim
into federal court to collect the debt might discourage borrowers from
asserting their federal rights under various consumer protection lending

41. Id. at 207-08.
42. Id. at 209-10.
43. Id. at 213-14.
44. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
45. All of the keys to identifying a transaction or occurrence discussed in supra notes
26-29, point in the same direction. One contract presented one set of facts. A lay person
would expect all aspects of one contract to be tried together. Treating one contract as
giving rise to one unit of judicial action made one case grow where two grew before. One
set of facts was one unit of judicial action. Both claim and counterclaim were part of the
course of dealing between the parties.
46. Jones, 358 F.3d at 208. The court apparently borrowed this thinking from some
Truth in Lending Act cases that were decided prior to 1990, at a time when the law was
clear that a permissive counterclaim did not qualify for ancillary jurisdiction. Simon, supra
note 4, at 304. A decision at that time that a counterclaim was permissive automatically
kept it out of federal court.
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statutes.
Not only was such a policy consideration irrelevant to
distinguishing between compulsory and permissive counterclaims, 47 but
also it was completely pointless to rule the counterclaim was only
permissive (so it could not be brought into federal court to undermine
federal policy) and, in the next paragraph, to rule supplemental
jurisdiction allowed the "permissive" counterclaim into federal court.
The end result is that both of the two seminal cases creating the line
of precedent that supplemental jurisdiction can extend to a permissive
counterclaim are at best seriously "grudging" and at worst transparently
erroneous on their interpretation of transaction or occurrence. Both
involved compulsory, not permissive, counterclaims. The precedent that
supplemental jurisdiction can extend to permissive counterclaims has no
foundation.
IV.

SUBSEQUENT CASES ADD TO THE MISCONCEPTION

With the precedent that supplemental jurisdiction can extend to
permissive counterclaims launched into the stream of the judicial
process, we cannot be surprised that later courts have accepted and even
extended it. With little or no reasoning or independent analysis, these
courts follow Channell and Jones to define transaction or occurrence
narrowly, to declare a compulsory counterclaim to be a permissive
counterclaim, and then to allow supplemental jurisdiction because both
claim and counterclaim are part of the same case or controversy. s
Some courts have even taken the next logical step to brush past
consideration of type of counterclaim as no longer needed on the way to

47. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also infra note 54.
48. See infra Parts IV.A-B. Even respected commentators have accepted Channell and
Jones at face value and thus embraced the theory that because "case or controversy under
Article III" requires only a "loose factual connection," supplemental jurisdiction can extend
to permissive counterclaims. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3567.1, at 359
("courts increasingly recognize that some permissive counterclaims can satisfy § 1367(a)");
Simon, supra note 4, at 308 ("statutory construction supports the courts' decisions in
[Channell and Jones]"). Cf Floyd, supra note 12, at 331 ("jurisdiction is necessary and
proper to permit the court to fairly and efficiently resolve the plaintiffs main claim").
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Nearly all of these cases fall

A Cluster of FairDebt Collection PracticesAct Cases

The largest cluster of cases following Channell and Jones present a
debtor plaintiff suing for abusive collection practices in violation of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)5 ° The defendant creditor
counterclaims for collection of the underlying debt. Of course, the claim
is a federal question and the counterclaim is a state law contract action.
Study of development of the idea that the counterclaim is only permissive yet within supplemental jurisdiction in this line of cases is
instructive.
The first case in the line actually presented the converse situation: the
creditor sued on the debt in state court, the debtors later sued under the
FDCPA in federal court, and the creditor moved to dismiss the federal
claim on the ground it was unpleaded in state court as a compulsory
counterclaim. 5' The court concluded the FDCPA counterclaim was only
permissive" in an opinion that was flawed in a number of serious
ways. The court relied on Truth in Lending Act 53 cases that looked to
a misleading notion of policy instead of facts.54 The court relied on

49. See Rothman v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding the
counterclaim "whether compulsory or permissive, was 'so related to' Rothman's original
claims that they form the same case or controversy"); CVPartners Inc. v. Boben, No. C0968951, 2009 WL 1331108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (stating "[wihether defendants'
counterclaims are characterized as compulsory or permissive, at a minimum they must
meet Section 1367's requirement that counterclaims be 'so related' to plaintiffs claims that
they form part of the same constitutional case."); Woodrow v. Satake Family Trust, No.
C06-2155WB, 2006 WL 2092630, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating court in doubt whether
counterclaim compulsory but confident within supplemental jurisdiction).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16 92 -1 69 2 p (2006 & Supp. 2010).
51. Peterson v. United Accounts, 638 F.2d 1134, 1135 (8th Cir. 1981).
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 147 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of title 15 of the United States Code).
54. Peterson, 638 F.2d at 1136. For example, Peterson quoted the seminal precedent,
Whigham v. Beneficial Finance Co., 599 F.2d 1322, 1324 (4th Cir. 1979): "The borrower's
federal claim involves the same loan, but it does not arise from the obligations created by
the contractual transaction ....Instead, the claim invokes a statutory penalty designed
to enforce federal policy against inadequate disclosure by lenders." 638 F.2d at 1136.
Whigham said both claim and counterclaim arose from the same contract, but it would not
find them both part of the same transaction or occurrence because of concern that allowing
the state law collection action to ride into federal court as a compulsory counterclaim on
ancillary jurisdiction might interfere with enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act. 599
F.2d at 1323-24. Such a policy consideration not only was irrelevant to identification of a
compulsory counterclaim, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, but also was a
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improper consideration of law instead of facts.55 The court rendered a
results-driven dictum in a hard case." The court's conclusion that the
counterclaim was only permissive resulted directly in the next step in
the line of decisions: finding the counterclaim only permissive and then
dismissing for want of supplemental jurisdiction.5"
Finally, several cases a decade later took the final step: they retained
the erroneous notion that the debt collection counterclaim in an FDCPA
action was only permissive, yet next decided the counterclaim was part
of the same case or controversy for supplemental jurisdiction. The first
5
case that bridged this gap clearly did so in dictum. " Only three
months later, a second case relied heavily on the first case and reached
the same conclusion, also in dictum. 9 Another three months later, a

misleading red herring. See McFarland, supra note 19, at 723-28.
55. For example, Peterson quoted Valencia v. Anderson Brothers Ford, 617 F.2d 1278,
1291 (7th Cir. 1980) rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981): "The TILA claim and

[debt] counterclaim raise different legal and factual issues governed by different bodies of
law." 638 F.2d at 1136. Law is irrelevant to identification of a compulsory counterclaim.
See supra note 27.
56. Peterson reached this illogical conclusion: "While the debt claim and the FDCPA
counterclaim raised here may, in a technical sense, arise from the same loan transaction,
the two claims bear no logical relation to one another." 638 F.2d at 1137. The court then
made the results-driven nature of its opinion apparent when it opined "it would be proper
for the district court to stay proceedings and direct that appellants proceed to file their
action as a permissive counterclaim in state court. If the state court does not accept
jurisdiction... the federal court may then proceed to decide the issues." Id.
57. Hart v. Clayton-Parker & Assocs., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D. Ariz. 1994). The
court followed the erroneous notion that law matters in order to conclude the facts of a
single contract did not form a single transaction or occurrence because "the FDCPA claim
and the claim on the underlying debt raise different legal and factual issues governed by
different bodies of law." Id. The court dismissed the counterclaim because "even under
section 1367(a) . .. federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims, but permissive counterclaims require their own jurisdictional basis." Id. at
776.
58. Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2005). In Sparrow,
the district court agreed with three cited district court decisions that "[wihile the debt does
provide some factual connection between the claims, because they arise out of the debt, the
legal issues and evidence relating to the claims are considered sufficiently distinct so as
not to meet the 'logical relationship' test." Id. at 1068. The reference to legal issues and
evidence shows the court's misunderstanding of the strictly fact-based inquiry into the
compulsory nature of a counterclaim. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, the court sparsely concluded "[b]ecause Defendant's counterclaims bear a
logical and factual relationship to Plaintiffs claims in that they are related to a single debt
incurred by Plaintiff, supplemental jurisdiction exists over Defendant's counterclaims under
§ 1367(a)." Sparrow, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. The court then made its earlier conclusions
dicta by exercising its discretionary power to dismiss under § 1367(c). Id. at 1070-71.
59. Campos v. W. Dental Serv., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2005). In
Campos, the court cited Sparrow for the conclusion that "[tihe claim and counterclaim are,
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third case also relied heavily on the first case, then took the next logical
step, also in dictum, that a court may skip consideration of whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive and proceed directly to decide
on the existence of supplemental jurisdiction.60 The last two cases
currently in the line simply cited these precedent cases to support the
dual conclusions that the debt counterclaim was permissive yet
supplemental jurisdiction existed."1
What we have in these FDCPA cases is an inconsistent pair of
conclusions: the debt does not arise from the same transaction or
occurrence, and yet the debt is part of a common nucleus of operative
fact that makes it part of the same case or controversy under Article III.
Again, the difficulty is easy to resolve. The notion that a debt counterclaim to a FDCPA claim is only permissive arose in a hard case with
seriously flawed analysis and developed through dicta in other cases

of course, 'offshoots' of the same basic transaction, but they do not represent the same basic
controversy between the parties." Id. at 1169 (quoting Sparrow, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1068).
On the same page, Campos, with a total absence of citation or reasoning, declared "there
will be some permissive counterclaims over which the court has supplemental jurisdiction
and some it does not. The reason is that the standard for supplemental jurisdiction is
broader than the standard for a counterclaim to be compulsory." Id. Still on the same
page, the court wrapped up by stating both claims were part of the same case or
controversy since both were "related to the single debt incurred by plaintiff." Id. Thus the
court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction cover this "permissive" counterclaim. As
with Sparrow, all of this discussion was dicta because the court then dismissed under
§ 1367(c). Id. at 1170-71.
60. Bakewell v. Fed. Fin. Gp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3538-JOF, 2006 WL 739807, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2006). The district court in Bakewell simply stated it found precedents
concluding the debt counterclaim was not a compulsory counterclaim to a FDCPA claim
persuasive, and then cited Sparrow for the proposition that the debt counterclaim arose
from a common nucleus of operative fact, and so qualified for supplemental jurisdiction.
Id. at *3-4. Earlier, the court suggested "it may no longer be necessary to determine if the
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive" in favor of moving directly to analyze whether
the counterclaim "bears a loose factual connection" to support supplemental jurisdiction.
Id. at *2. Despite this suggestion, the opinion did proceed to that determination. Id. at
*4.
61. See Randall v. Nelson & Kennard, No. CV-09-387-PHX-LOA, 2009 WL 2710141, at
*3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2009) (stating debt counterclaim was permissive under precedents
from Ninth Circuit courts but nonetheless part of common nucleus of operative fact since
related to a single debt); Koumarian v. Chase Bank USA, NA, No. C-08-4033MMC, 2008
WL 5120053, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008) (making the remarkable assertion that
counterclaim only permissive since "claim will require evidence of defendants' conduct in
attempting to collect the debt ... whereas proof of Chase's Counterclaim will require
evidence that the debt in question is valid and due" yet concluding "both claims are related
to a single debt" and so part of a common nucleus of operative fact for supplemental
jurisdiction).
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until it approached settled doctrine. 2 This line of precedent is analytically groundless; it should be challenged and eradicated. The conclusion
that the debt counterclaim is part of a common nucleus of operative fact,
and so part of the same case or controversy, is consistent with the entire
federal rules system. The same analysis that makes the counterclaim
subject to supplemental jurisdiction makes it part of the same transaction or occurrence. It arises out of the same set of facts, which is the
litigation unit of federal practice and rules states practice.6 3 These are
compulsory counterclaims.
B. A Few FairLabor StandardsAct Cases Clustered in One District
The second cluster of cases extending the misconception originated in
a court of appeals decision but has expanded in a single federal district.
These cases present a plaintiff suing to collect wages or overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the employer
counterclaiming for an act of plaintiff committed during the employment
relationship.
Four years after enactment of § 1367, the plaintiff sued on three
theories of recovery: a FLSA violation for failure to pay overtime, a
breach of contract for paying a smaller bonus than promised, and a tort
for threatening to withhold a bonus."5 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit denied supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff's state law theories because the FLSA claim involved very
narrow, well-defined factual issues about hours worked during particular
weeks. 6 The facts relevant to her state law contract and tort claims,
which involved "[defendant's] alleged underpayment of a bonus and its
refusal to pay the bonus if [plaintiff] started looking for another job,
were quite distinct." 7 Not only did all three theories of recovery arise
from a single employment relationship, but also all three arose from
due." Yet the court could not discern
failure to pay compensation
"even a 'loose' nexus." 9 Despite the natural factual grouping of the
employment relation,7" the court broke the dealings between the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 759 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 764.
Id. at 763.
Id.

69. Id.
70. The "transaction or occurrence" is a term of "great flexibility" to include a "course
of dealings between the parties." CLARK, supra note 26, § 102, at 655. A lay person would
expect all aspects of the dealings between employer and employee to be included, see supra
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employer and the employee over one job into unrelated parts.7 1 To call
this decision grudging is charitable. While this case involved supplemental jurisdiction over additional theories of recovery-formerly
pendent jurisdiction-rather than supplemental jurisdiction over a
compulsory counterclaim-formerly ancillary jurisdiction-the shadow
of its attitude has continued to loom over FLSA cases.
This was shown in four decisions by two judges from a single federal
district: all concluded a counterclaim for an employee's actions during
the course of employment was only permissive to an FLSA claim by the
employee for failure to pay overtime wages.72 These decisions relied on
each other to conclude the employer's counterclaim was only permissive,
yet allowed the employer's claim to continue as a set off, which was
asserted to be "a well recognized exception to the independent jurisdictional requirement for permissive counterclaims."" The notion that a
set off is an exception that qualifies for supplemental jurisdiction has
been around for a long time, but it too is a misconception.7 4
C. A Later-MaturingCounterclaim
A single unusual case-at first glance-appears to be the only actual
assertion of supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim."
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated it was
joining the Seventh Circuit [Channell] and the Second Circuit [Jones] by
allowing supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims in

note 27, and the convenience and efficiency of having a court already familiar with the
parties and the dispute resolve these matters is apparent, see supra note 29.
71. Lyon, 45 F.3d at 763.
72. The first decision was Mercer v. Palm HarborHomes, Inc., No. 805CV1425T30TGW,

2005 WL 3019302, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2005) (concluding in a one-page opinion that
facts supporting counterclaim of converting equipment "are distinct" from facts supporting
FLSA claim yet allowing claim as set off). Three additional opinions in the same court

followed. See DeJesus v. Emerald Coast Connections of St. Petersburg, Inc., No. 8:10-CV462-T-30TBH, 2010 WL 2508844, at *2(M.D. Fla. June 17,2010) (concluding counterclaim
for converting equipment only permissive to FLSA claim yet allowing as set off); Goings

v. Advanced Sys., Inc., No. 8:08-CV-1110-T-33TGW, 2008 WL 4195889, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 12, 2008) (concluding counterclaim for repayment of loan advances for health

insurance of employee only permissive to FLSA claim yet allowing as set off); Cole v.
Supreme Cabinets, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-772-J-33TEH 2007 WL 1696029, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June
12, 2007) (concluding counterclaim for conversion by returning company vehicle damaged

is only permissive to FLSA claim because "the aggregate core of facts upon which Cole's
claims rest are the facts of his employment with Supreme Cabinets, not the facts of his
behavior following the termination" yet allowing as set off).
73. E.g., Mercer, 2005 WL 3019302, at *2.
74. See infra Part V.

75. Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 87 (1st Cir. 2010).
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Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc.7" The plaintiff Global
Naps sued the defendant Verizon in a dispute over interconnection
77
agreements under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996.
78
Verizon asserted a state law counterclaim for unpaid access charges.
After four years of litigation, Verizon suspected Global Naps was
transferring money to its affiliates to avoid a potential judgment on the
counterclaim and amended (supplemented) the counterclaim to add state
law theories of alter ego liability and disregard of the corporate form.79
The court sensibly held that supplemental jurisdiction encompassed
the additional theories in the counterclaim.' It reasoned, "Verizon's
counterclaim is more than sufficiently related to GNAPs' complaint.
Both parties' claims ultimately arise from a dispute over the same
agreement and involve the same basic factual question: what fees the
carriers owe each other." l The court also noted, "[I]t was sensible...
to try Verizon's claim to pierce the corporate veil with the rest of the
litigation, rather than sending count three to state court ....

The

district court was familiar with, and had developed expertise on, the
complicated claims at issue."82
The question remained what type of counterclaim was presented to the
court. The First Circuit thought because the new theories did not exist
at the time of the original answer, the counterclaim could not be
compulsory.' Since the counterclaim could not be compulsory, it had
to be permissive. Yet because the facts that gave rise to the counter-

76. Id.
77. See id. at 76-77; Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of title 47 of the United States Code).
78. Global Naps, Inc., 603 F.3d at 77.
79. Id. at 80-81.
80. Id. at 84-85.
81. Id. at 85.
82. Id. at 88. This thinking brings to mind the famous language in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), that when "a plaintiffs claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole." Id.
at 725. The court in Gibbs also repeated "'the whole tendency of our decisions [is] . . . to
require a plaintiff to try his ... whole case at one time.'" Id. at 725 n.13 (quoting
Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320 (1927)).
That language in turn leads back to the procedural philosophy of one-case-fits-all
embodied throughout the federal rules by their primary drafter, Charles E. Clark. See
supra note 26. Gibbs embraces Clark's "operative facts" formulation. Richard A. Matasar,
Rediscovering"One Constitutional Case": ProceduralRules and the Rejection of the Gibbs
Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction,71 CALIF. L. Rav. 1399, 1453 (1983).
83. Global Naps, Inc., 603 F.3d at 85-86. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(aXl) defines a compulsory
counterclaim as "any claim that-at the time of its service-the pleader has against an
opposing party."
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claim formed part of a common nucleus of operative fact with the claim,
and the two should be tried together, the court thought its only possible
resolution was either to apply the general rule and dismiss the
permissive counterclaim for lack of federal jurisdiction or join the
Channell and Jones line of precedent to assert supplemental jurisdiction
over a permissive counterclaim."
The court was not held to that dilemma. A sounder analysis would
have been to recognize the new alter ego theories of the counterclaim did
arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the claim. This was
not a compulsory counterclaim only because it did not exist at the time
of pleading the answer. It was a later-maturing counterclaim.'I Had
the counterclaim been in existence at the time of the original answer,
the court's analysis of why it was part of the same case or controversy
without doubt would have resulted in finding it to be a compulsory
counterclaim. The court could have reasoned it was asserting supplemental jurisdiction over a later-maturing counterclaim that would have
been compulsory. The court simply did not recognize this line of
analysis that would have been more consistent with its overall reasoning, more in line with recognized law, and more powerful.
V.

THE SET OFF EXCEPTION: A RELATED MISCONCEPTION

Related to today's counterclaim practice is the common law ancestor
set off. By definition, a set off is a claim by a defendant back against a
plaintiff for affirmative relief; the claim has to be liquidated or capable
of ready calculation, it has to be a situation in which equity will act, and
it has to arise from a different transaction." Equity will act, for
example, when a defendant might have to pay a plaintiff's claim and
then be unable to collect a claim back against the plaintiff.87

84. Global Naps, Inc., 603 F.3d at 87.
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(e) ("The court may permit a party to file a supplemental
pleading asserting a counterclaim that matured or was acquired by the party after serving
an earlier pleading.").
86. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1870, at 471 (4th ed. 1918); William
A. Fletcher, "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact"and Defensive Set-off. Beyond the Gibbs
Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 172 (1998); Matasar, supra note 82, at 1474-75 & nn.344-45.
Another ancestor of the counterclaim is the common law procedure of recoupment.
Recoupment is limited to a claim by defendant that arises from the same contract or
transaction as plaintiffs claim. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1401, at 4. Typically,
defendant seeks to reduce damages by claiming plaintiffs breach of the same contract or
obligation, and no affirmative relief can be granted. See id. Recoupment is not relevant
to this Article.
87. See Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some JurisdictionalLimitations on
FederalProcedure,45 YALE L.J. 393, 414-15 (1936).
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One can immediately recognize that asserting supplemental jurisdiction over a set off is problematical because the set off has to arise from
a different transaction, which by definition means it is factually
unrelated to the plaintiff's claim.88 Yet many courts and commentators
today assert that set off is an exception to the usual factual relatedness
9
requirement, and that a set off qualifies for supplemental jurisdiction.
The assertion that a set off does not require independent federal
jurisdiction was first made by the author of the earliest treatise on the
federal rules, James William Moore, when he wrote in the same year the
federal rules were promulgated that a permissive counterclaim "is an
independent and unrelated claim and needs independent jurisdictional
9
grounds to support it, with one exception. Set-off is that exception." "
The problem with this bold and counterintuitive assertion is Moore had
neither analysis nor precedential support. He created the "set-off
exception" out of the whole cloth. 9 '
Despite the lack of foundation, the set off exception has survived.
courts. 92
Moore's creation initially received a mixed response in the
More recently, the Third Circuit noted the absence of any precedential
base and declined to adopt the exception, yet retained jurisdiction over
what it called a permissive counterclaim because it arose out of the
common nucleus of operative fact and would be expected to be tried
together.93 The Seventh Circuit seemed to accept the set off exception

88. The same transaction (or transaction or occurrence) requires factual relatedness.
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
90.

1 JAMES W. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.03, at

696 (1938).

91. Moore did admit in a footnote that "[n]o cases squarely in point have been found
to support the text...." MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 90, at 696 n.17. One court said
the exception "was apparently invented by Professor Moore," and that the "origins of this
exception are not totally clear." Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972,988,
988 n.47 (3d Cir. 1984). One well-known opinion referred to "Professor Moore's sound
recognition-perhaps more accurately creation-of the exception." United States ex rel.
D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., concurring). Another court thought "[t]he ancillary status given set-offs is
best explained historically from their source in English statute." Revere Copper & Brass
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970). See also McLaughlin,

supra note 13, at 923-24.

92. Compare Marks v. Spitz, 4 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D. Mass. 1945) (accepting set off
exception) with Robertson Bros. & Co. v. Tygart Steel Prods. Co., 9 F.R.D. 468, 469 (W.D.
Pa. 1949) (rejecting set off exception).
93. See Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 988-92. While the opinion clearly stated it did not
accept the "defensive set-off exception," it unfortunately continued to refer to defendant's
claim as "the set-off claim." Id. at 988, 992. It retained federal jurisdiction over the

"permissive counterclaimD" on the ground that it fell within the common nucleus of
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so long as the claim had a "loose factual connection" with the plaintiff's
claim,94 but the opinion was seriously flawed. s5 Following this unsteady lead, several courts have repeated the set off exception as settled
law.16 As a consequence, the two leading commentaries on the federal
rules have both stated that the set off is an exception to the usual
requirement of factual relatedness for supplemental jurisdiction."
Not a single one of these sources provides any analytical basis for the
"set-off exception." The so-called exception makes no analytical sense.
It cannot be justified on the ground of equity. Federal jurisdiction is
neither grounded nor limned by equity. It cannot be justified on the
grounds of efficiency and convenience. Federal jurisdiction is not based
on efficiency and convenience." It cannot be justified on the ground
that the claim and the set off are parts of a single litigation unit. By
definition a set off arises from a separate transaction, which means it

operative fact and expected to try together the tests of Gibbs. Id. at 990-92.
94. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1996).
95. The opinion stated that the "award in favor of each subclass member need not be
paid, but could be set off against sums due to Citicorp." Id. at 386. Here the court's use
of "set off" was not a true use of the term. First, it was approving plaintiffs setting off
their awards against a counterclaiming defendant. Second, it retained these claims
because of their factual connection; this was contrary to the definition of set off, which has
always required a separate and unrelated transaction. Accordingly, this case should not
be cited as support for the set off exception. Beyond that, the opinion in Channell was
seriously flawed on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. See supra Part III.
In a similar fashion, an influential article sometimes cited to support the set off
exception used the term in a loose sense and did not actually support the exception. See
Green, supra note 5. Professor Green did write that a "counterclaim or set-off is not a
separate action," id. at 273 n.13, and that defensive set-off resulted in saving time and
effort with only a slightly added burden on the federal court, id. at 279, yet he expressly
disapproved resort to the equitable roots of set off "for the measure of federal jurisdiction."
Id. at 288.
96. See MOORE ET AL., supranote 2, at § 13.40 (collecting cases); WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 2, at § 3523, 189 n.89 (collecting cases).
97. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at § 13.110(1)(b) ("Claims for setoff, not seeking
affirmative relief and interposed merely to defeat or reduce the opposing party's claim,
provide an exception to the Rule that permissive counterclaims require an independent
basis for jurisdiction."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at § 3523, at 189 ("The only exception
to this latter rule was when the permissive counterclaim took the form of a set-off, in which
case supplemental jurisdiction would be available.").
98. The efficiency and convenience to the court and the parties ofhandling all disputes
between the parties appear to be the principal justification for the exception. See, e.g.,
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1422, at 202 (asserting set off promotes general "federal
policy against multiplicity of actions"); Green, supra note 5, at 279 ("The general
convenience will be served and a saving made in effort, time, and money of parties,
witnesses, lawyers, state jurors, and the state court... [while] burden on the federal court
will be slight.").
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cannot be part of the same litigation unit; it is part of a separate
99
transaction (or occurrence) and cannot be factually related. The set
off exception by its very nature contravenes the "same case or controversy under Article III" limit on supplemental jurisdiction established in
§ 1367(a).0 °
VI.

CONCLUSION: No SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION EXISTS OVER
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS

This Article examines the rapidly growing line of precedent that
supplemental jurisdiction can exist over a permissive counterclaim. The
line springs from two decisions boldly asserting the "case or controversy
under Article III" test of§ 1367(a) for supplemental jurisdiction requires
the
only a "loose factual connection" of the facts, and so is broader than
rule.1 1
"transaction or occurrence" test of the compulsory counterclaim
Almost every one of the later cases in the line of precedent simply cites
the two founding cases without attempting any additional reasoning or
analysis.

10 2

The entire line of precedent-every one of these cases-is based on a
narrow, grudging definition of transaction or occurrence. Of course,
when transaction or occurrence is defined narrowly, case or controversy
is broader. Yet when transaction or occurrence is properly defined
03 Certainly
broadly, it too requires only a "loose factual connection."
this was the exact concept Gibbs 4was attempting to convey with
"common nucleus of operative fact."'
Even though several cases announce they are asserting supplemental
jurisdiction over a "permissive counterclaim," analysis demonstrates that

99. Marks, 4 F.R.D. at 350.
100. See McLaughlin, supranote 13, at 924. Cf. Matasar, supranote 82, at 1475 n.347.
101. The two founding cases are Channell v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 89 F.3d
379, 385 (7th Cir. 1996), and Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir.
2004). See supra Part III. For the compulsory counterclaim rule, see supra note 3.
102. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
103. See supranotes 26-29 and accompanying text. See alsoWRIGHT ET AL., supra note
2, § 3567.1, at 349 (collecting cases).
104. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). One commentator puts
the matter in a straightforward fashio= "[Tihe supplemental claim must be so transactionally related to the underlying dispute as to be part of one case." Freer, supra note 4, at
447. Indeed, tying the concepts together was perhaps the overriding theme of Gibbs: "the
underlying theme of the Gibbs opinion was to offer parallel jurisdictional support, within
constitutional limits, to complement the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 873. A similar thought was expressed
prior to the statutory codification of supplemental jurisdiction in 1990. See Matasar, supra
note 82, at 1453. But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3567.1, at 349; Fletcher, supra
note 86, at 171 n.4.
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is not so. The great bulk of cases forming this burgeoning line of
precedent clearly involves compulsory counterclaims.' 5 One unusual
case presents what is better analyzed as a later-maturing counterclaim
that would have been compulsory.0 6 A few cases involve the baseless
"set-off exception." 7 Not one case soundly asserts supplemental
jurisdiction over a true permissive counterclaim.
Well-accepted law prior to 1990 was that compulsory counterclaims
were carried into federal court by ancillary jurisdiction and permissive
counterclaims were not. The creation of supplemental jurisdiction in
§ 1367 does not change the law. The assertion that supplemental
jurisdiction exists over permissive counterclaims is merely a misconception.

105. See supra Parts IVA-B.
106. See supra Part IV.C.
107. See supra Part V.

